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Legal Transplantation of UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore 
 
 
Wai Yee Wan*  
 
Abstract 
 
In the early 1970s, Singapore adopted the Singapore Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (Takeover Code) and set up the Securities Industry Council (SIC), both of which 
were based on the UK City Code of Takeovers and Mergers (City Code) and UK Takeover 
Panel respectively. The legal transplantation occurred even though Singapore did not have 
the equivalent of the business community to the City of London. The concentrated 
ownership structure of Singapore listed firms also differs significantly from the Berle and 
Means ownership model found in the UK firms, even today.  
 This chapter gives an account of takeover regulation in Singapore and explains the 
reasons for the adoption and maintenance of the UK-takeover regulation from the 
perspectives of demand side (being the individuals, firms or public) and supply side (being 
the legislature, courts and regulators) of rule production.  
First, the regulatory framework has been responsive to blockholders generally by 
successive increasing the mandatory bid threshold progressively from 20% in 1974 to 30% 
in 2002 and adhering to the creeper rule (which was abolished by the UK in 1998). 
Together with the availability of the whitewash waiver, blockholders have more flexibility 
to increase their stake or to inject fresh cash/assets into the company without making a 
mandatory bid for the remaining shares.   
Second, even though concentrated shareholdings are the norm among listed 
companies, there was a significant proportion of companies where any group of 
blockholders does not have statutory control (that is, more than 50%). The requirement in 
the Takeover Code that directors of a target company must seek shareholder approval for 
action that would frustrate a bona fide bid limits the potential for these blockholders to 
prevent bona fide bids from succeeding, in the absence of case law.  
Third, while investor protection rights in Singapore under company law and 
takeover regulation are similar to the UK, there remains an important area of difference 
which favour the blockholders seeking to privatise targets; blockholders are able to use 
their shareholding to first delist the target, an option that is not readily available in UK.  
Finally, adopting the process of regulation in the UK model enables the SIC a quick 
and efficient process to informally and proactively enforce norms and public interests and 
this process of takeover regulation has deeper, substantive consequences. Recent examples 
will be drawn to show that SIC has used the power to intervene or adjust the legal rights of 
the market participants, particularly the bidder, where such rights are inconsistent with the 
public interests.  
This chapter then sets out the effect of the legal transplantation on the market for 
corporate control in Singapore, in comparison with the UK, and concludes by answering 
the normative question of whether the current model of takeover regulation should 
continue as the Singapore stock market attracts more foreign participation but also 
experiences a higher level of concentration in its listed companies and delistings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In 1973, the Securities Industry Council (“SIC”) was set up as a specialist body to 
administer and enforce Singaporean takeover regulation. The SIC draws its members 
from the private and public sectors, with the majority of voting power from the private 
sector.1 In the following year, the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover 
Code”), based on the UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“City Code”), came into 
force. The Takeover Code is the primary source of regulation of the conduct of parties to 
a public takeover, together with the Securities and Futures Act (“SFA”), 2 the listing rules 
of the Singapore Stock Exchange (“SGX”) and principles of company law (such as those 
defining the relationship between the directors of the company and its shareholders found 
in the Companies Act3 and case law). While the SIC and the Takeover Code have 
statutory backing found in the SFA, the Takeover Code was, in the tradition of the City 
Code, self-regulatory. The SIC’s role was to enforce the Takeover Code and resolve 
takeovers disputes in a non-judicial setting.  
 
                                                        
*  Associate Professor of Law, Lee Kong Chian Fellow, Singapore Management University. This 
research was supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic Research Fund (AcRF) 
Tier 1 grant 15-C234-SDF-001. I thank Yao Qinzhe for his research assistance. An earlier version of this 
paper was presented at the Conference on Comparative Takeover Regulation 2015 held at National 
University of Singapore and Singapore Management University and I thank the participants, in particular, 
Umakanth Varottil and Ng Wai King, for their helpful comments and discussions. This paper is intended to 
be a chapter in Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (forthcoming 2017, 
Cambridge University Press), edited by Umakanth Varottil and Wan Wai Yee.   
 
1  ‘Singapore has more bite than London’, Business Times (29 September 1978). 
2  Securities and Futures Act, Cap 289, 2006 Rev Ed, s. 139(4)  
3  Companies Act, Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed (“Companies Act”). 
 3 
 
Prior to 2002, the Takeover Code was amended in 1979 and 1985. In 2002, 
following lengthy consultations in 19994 and 2001,5 the Takeover Code was substantially 
re-written to bring it up to date with international norms. Further amendments were made 
in 2007 and 2012. However, two fundamental rules of the Takeover Code which were 
transplanted from UK City Code, namely the mandatory bid rule and the prohibition on 
the target board from frustrating any bona fide bid in the absence of shareholder approval 
(the no-frustration rule), have remained largely unchanged since 1974. In particular, in 
1999, the SIC led a consultation to consider the possibility of adopting a US-style 
takeover regulation, which allows the target board to block a hostile bid, but this 
possibility was rejected by market participants.  
 
In an influential article discussing the evolution of the hostile takeover regime in 
UK and US, Armour and Skeel argue that UK takeover regulation, favouring greater 
protection of shareholders’ interests found in the City Code, is attributable to the UK’s 
self-regulatory regime and aggressive lobbying by the institutional shareholders, as 
opposed to the US where the courts remain the arbiter of takeover disputes.6 The UK 
approach clearly favours institutional investors in companies with significantly dispersed 
shareholdings. More recently, Armour, Jacobs and Milhaupt extended the analysis to 
Japan, which has adopted elements of US takeover regulation and which has largely 
                                                        
4  SIC, ‘Consultation Paper on Revision of the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers’ (1999) 
(“1999 Consultation”), available at www.mas.gov.sg/sic (last accessed 30 June 2016). 
5  SIC, Securities Industry Council Issues Draft Revised Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2001) 
(“2001 Consultation”), available at www.gov.sg.sic (last accessed 30 June 2016). 
6  See John Armour and David Skeel, Jr, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – 
The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation’, Georgetown Law Journal 95 (2007), 
1727-1794 (arguing, in the context of explaining why US and UK have different substantive rules on 
defensive measures, that the mode of regulation matters).  
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dispersed shareholdings of publicly listed companies. They argue that the diversity in the 
hostile takeover regimes in all three jurisdictions is the product of the interaction between 
the ‘demand side’ (being the individuals, firms or public) and the ‘supply side’ of rule 
production (being the legislature, courts and regulators).7 Armour and Skeel make an 
important contribution in explaining that the process of takeover regulation does 
influence the outcome or the substance of the regulation. UK takeover regulation is 
shaped by institutional shareholders pre-empting legislative intervention while US 
regulation is derived from judge-made case law, largely from Delaware.  
 
The question then arises whether this theory based on the interaction between 
demand and supply in explaining takeover regulation in UK/US can also be extended to 
their legal transplants in other jurisdictions, particularly those whose public companies 
are dominated by concentrated shareholdings. The adoption and enduring nature of UK-
style of takeover regulation in Singapore presents an interesting case study. Prima facie, 
the adoption and widespread acceptance of the UK-takeover regime is a puzzle since the 
public ownership structure in Singapore has been, and remains, largely concentrated. 
Why would existing large shareholders (also known as blockholders in this paper) favour 
the mandatory bid rule which not only prevents them from obtaining a control premium 
for their controlling stake but also restricts them from increasing their stake without 
having to make a mandatory bid? Why would existing blockholders support a no-
                                                        
7  See John Armour, Jack B Jacobs, Curtis J Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes 
in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’, Harvard International Law Journal 52 
(2011), 221-285 
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frustration rule on target board action since such a rule is unnecessary; their concentrated 
shareholdings themselves act as a takeover defence against potential unfriendly bids?  
 
This paper argues that consistent with the analysis of Armour and Skeel, the 
reason for Singapore’s enduring support (with small but important modifications) of the 
UK-style of takeover regulation is the interaction between the relevant interest groups, in 
this case, being the significant blockholders (generally family groups or the state), and 
the regulator.8 However, Singapore’s legal transplant of UK-style takeover regulation has 
resulted in two different outcomes for the shareholding structures of public companies 
and the landscape of the market for corporate control.  
 
First, the shareholdings of Singapore companies are becoming more concentrated 
while the opposite is occurring for shareholdings of UK companies. This paper argues 
that the mandatory bid rule, when introduced in a jurisdiction with concentrated 
shareholdings, is a substantial factor contributing to the reinforcement of the low 
dispersal of ownership. Second, in respect of the market for corporate control, there are 
two important differences in the way takeovers are structured in both jurisdictions. An 
M&A transaction in Singapore is much less likely to be hostile or unsolicited in 
Singapore than in the UK. Thus, for those who argue that the disciplinary effect of hostile 
takeovers on management is good for the market,9 the implementation of the UK-style of 
takeover regulation has not led to such disciplinary effect in Singapore. Further, outside 
                                                        
8  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry HP Lang ‘The separation of ownership and control in 
East Asian Corporations’ Journal of Financial Economics 58 (2000), 81-112.  
9  E.g. see Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(1991) pp. 171-73.  
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of general offers, the most significant method of taking a company private in Singapore is 
effected via a delisting coupled with an exit offer. In contrast, outside of general offers, 
the most significant method of taking a company private in the UK is through a scheme 
of arrangement (which, as explained below, provides greater protection to the minority 
shareholders).  
 
Part II first sets out the background and the regulatory landscape of takeovers in 
Singapore. Part III argues that the takeover regime in Singapore represents the outcome 
of the interaction between significant interest groups and the regulator. First, since the 
1970s, small but significant modifications to the mandatory bid rule (including the 
creeper provisions)10 and its exceptions have ensured the continued relevance of the 
mandatory rule to blockholders’ needs. Second, the argument that the no-frustration rule 
is irrelevant in jurisdictions with concentrated shareholdings assumes a binary division 
between dispersed shareholding and majority-controlled companies (that is, more than 
50%). However, there are companies where there is more than one blockholder and none 
of these blockholders have majority control of the company; this is known as ‘insecure 
blockholder control’.11 In such cases, the requirement of prior shareholder approval for 
potentially frustrating actions restricts these insecure blockholders from taking measures 
to prevent other bona fide bids from succeeding.  
 
                                                        
10  The ‘creeper’ provisions were abolished by the UK Takeover Panel in 1998. These provisions 
allowed a person who held between 30% and 50% of the voting rights of a public company to increase his 
holding by up to 1% in any 12 month period without having to make a mandatory bid for the company.  
11  This term is borrowed from Paul Davies, Edmund Philipp Schuster, Emilie Walle de Ghelcke, 
‘The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool’ European Corporate Governance Institute Working 
Papers No.141/2010. For examples of ‘insecure’ blockholder control, see below, nn 63 and accompanying 
text.    
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Finally, from the supply side of rule production, once the SIC has established its 
authority, the process of regulation allows the SIC a quick and efficient process to 
informally and proactively enforce norms and public interests. Drawing from examples 
where the SIC has used its power to informally and proactively enforce norms and public 
interests, this process of takeover regulation has deeper, substantive consequences. The 
SIC has used their power to intervene or indirectly adjust the parties’ legal rights if such 
rights are inconsistent with the public interest of ensuring a fair and orderly securities 
market. Otherwise, if such behaviour is left unchecked, there may be a push for greater 
legislative reforms or regulatory intervention. Such phenomenon is also found in the UK; 
the establishment of the Takeover Panel and the City Code have pre-empted greater 
legislative reform.12 The establishment of the SIC also means that very few disputes 
reach the courts.  
 
Part IV then addresses the effect of legal transplantation on the shareholding 
structures of publicly listed companies and the market for corporate control in Singapore 
based on empirical data that is available since the 1990s. The empirical evidence shows 
that: (1) since the 1990s, the concentration of shareholdings of Singapore-listed 
companies has increased and Singapore has moved even further away from the Berle and 
Means model that is characteristic of UK firms; (2) hostile takeovers are non-existent and 
unsolicited takeover bids are rare as compared to the UK; and (3) the dominant method 
for effecting going private transactions by controlling shareholders in Singapore, outside 
                                                        
12  e.g. see Armour and Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why’, p. 1771. See 
Andrew Johnston, The City Takeover Code, n21,  pp. 41(quoting the Chairman of the committee that 
produced the City Code as their last chance before legislation).    
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general offers, is delisting coupled with a general offer, as compared to the scheme of 
arrangement in the UK.  
 
Part V then addresses the recent trends and their implications on takeover 
regulation in Singapore. First, will the current regulatory framework, which rests on 
informal regulation and reputational sanctions among the business and financial 
community, continue to be sustainable, particularly with the rise of foreign listings and an 
influx of foreign investment? Second, with the potential overlap in jurisdiction between 
the courts and the SIC, will the parties be able to seek redress in the courts in takeover 
disputes and obtain a different result? Part V concludes. 
 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF TAKEOVER LANDSCAPE IN 
SINGAPORE  
 
1. The Regulatory Landscape 
The legal system of Singapore is based on the common law, where case 
precedents and statutory provisions exist side by side. Singapore obtained its 
independence in 1965, and the Companies Act13 was passed in 1967. The Companies Act 
of 1967 was based on the Australian Companies Act 196114 and the UK Companies Act 
                                                        
13  Act 42 of 1967.   
14  Victoria No. 6839/1961. 
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1948. The provisions in the current edition of the Companies Act15 that are relevant to 
takeovers include the statutory statement of directors’ duties (particularly defining the 
relationship between the directors and the shareholders),16 capital maintenance rules17 
and schemes of arrangement,18 schemes of amalgamation19 and the compulsory 
acquisition of minority shareholders’ shares.20 
 
In addition to company law, there are more specific regulations governing the 
takeover process, principally, the SFA and Takeover Code. Section 138 of the SFA 
provides for the SIC to be set up. Section 139 of the SFA provides that for the more 
effective administration, supervision and control of take-over offers and matters 
connected therewith, the Monetary Authority of Singapore shall, on the advice of the SIC 
issue a Takeover Code. Section 140 of the SFA lists the offences relating to takeover 
offers. It is an offence for a person to give notice or publicly announce that he intends to 
make a takeover offer if he has no intention to make one. It is also an offence to make a 
takeover offer if a person has no reasonable or probable grounds for believing that he will 
be able to perform his obligations pursuant to the offer being accepted or approved. 
 
The original impetus for the setting up of the SIC (and the Takeover Code) was 
similar to the setting up of the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers in the UK.21 Prior to 
                                                        
15  Companies Act, 2006 Rev ed.  
16  Companies Act, s 157. 
17  Companies Act, ss 78A-K. 
18  Companies Act, s 210. 
19  Companies Act, s 215A-J. 
20  Companies Act, s 215. 
21  For a historical account, see A Johnston, The City Takeover Code (Oxford University Press, 
1980). 
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1974, the conduct of takeovers and mergers in Singapore was largely laissez faire; the 
companies’ legislation which applied at that time had many deficiencies and the stock 
exchange was a self-regulatory body.22 Similar to the UK’s British Aluminium affair 
which prompted the adoption of the Notes of Amalgamation of British Businesses in 
1959 (subsequently replaced by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in 1968), the 
pivotal transaction that demonstrated the inadequacy and lack of administrative control in 
supervising takeovers in Singapore was the takeover of Haw Par Brothers International 
by Slater, Walker (SW), UK Merchant Bank in 1971.23  
 
SW had been involved in asset stripping activities in Australia and the UK. In 
1971, SW purchased 46% of Haw Par shares from the existing shareholder, Aw, together 
with another 6% in the market. The takeover was conditional upon Haw Par’s 31% stake 
in Chung Khiaw Bank being increased to 51%. This additional 20% was to be acquired 
by Haw Par from Aw’s family and associates and the total cost to Haw Par for the 51% 
stake was S$8 million. The share price of Haw Par steadily rose until the date of the 
announcement of the takeover.  
 
In the meantime, SW procured Haw Par to sell its Chung Khiaw Bank stake to 
United Overseas Bank (“UOB”) for S$22 million, which would result in Haw Par making 
a profit of $14 million. The initial announcement of the proposed takeover of Chung 
Khiaw Bank upset its staff. In the face of opposition from the staff, UOB agreed not to 
                                                        
22  See Pheng T Tan, Securities Regulation in Singapore and Malaysia: A Primer on the Laws of the 
Stock Market with Cases and Materials (Stock Exchange of Singapore, 1979), pp. 28-29. 
23 See ‘Annex to Speech by the Minister for Finance’, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 31 (1971), 
col 137. See also Philip Pillai, ‘Corporate Takeovers in Singapore’ Malaya Law Review 15 (1973) 170-233. 
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proceed with the takeover and that Aw would repurchase the Haw Par shares from SW. 
However, SW subsequently procured Haw Par to proceed with the sale of the Chung 
Khiaw Bank shares to UOB.  
 
In the meantime, conflicting statements over the purchase of Chung Khiaw shares 
were issued, causing price fluctuations in the market. The MAS and the SGX required the 
participants to explain their actions. Subsequently, the Minister for Finance characterised 
the conduct of the parties as ‘though not illegal, [this] would constitute unacceptable 
behaviour in an international financial centre’.24  
 
In addition to the liquidation of Chung Khiaw shares, SW also procured Haw Par 
to sell Sin Poh, which controlled the newspapers in Singapore and Penang, for S$5 
million. 25 The liquidation of Haw Par’s assets (including its stake in Chung Khiaw and 
Sin Poh) raised alarm among the business community at the profiteering by SW and 
caused the Government to study the takeovers in greater detail.  
 
The activities of SW coincided with general turmoil in the stock market in 
Singapore and Malaysia in the late 1960s. The collapse of two large listed companies, 
Federal Paper Products and Eupoc Pulp and Paper Industries Ltd, together with the lack 
of control over the qualifications of securities dealers, demonstrated that the laisses faire 
                                                        
24  See SIC, ‘Regulatory Framework, Securities Industry Council and Takeover Code’ in Wai Y Wan 
and Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law and Practice (Lexisnexis, 2013), para 
3.2-3.3. See also ‘Speech by the Minister for Finance’, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 31 (1971), col 
114. 
25  ‘It’s a Deal: $22 million in cash’ Straits Times, (18 June 1971). 
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nature of stock exchange regulation had many deficiencies.26 Cognisant of these issues, in 
1969, George M Ferris, the then Governor of the New York Stock Exchange, was 
appointed to study the securities industry situation. In an influential report,27 he 
recommended that Singapore should continue with self-regulation of the stock exchange 
as self-regulation could never be effectively replaced by supervision undertaken by a 
centralised independent regulatory body along the lines of the US Securities Exchange 
Commission.28  
   
The Singapore Government adopted Ferris’s recommendations to continue self-
regulation by the stock exchange. At the same time, the Government rejected a statutory 
regulation of takeovers, on the ground that it was impossible for legislation to cover all 
abusive conduct.29 It was decided that the UK City Code on Takeovers would be adopted 
in Singapore. While the City Code was not perfect and was subject to criticism in the 
UK,30 and Singapore lacked the expertise found in the City, a ‘calculated risk’ was taken 
to transplant the City Code and the UK Takeover Panel.31 However, two significant 
                                                        
26  Pheng T Tan, Securities Regulation in Singapore and Malaysia, p. 30. 
27  George M Ferris, ‘A Study of the Securities Market in Singapore and Malaysia’, IESC Project 
2067 (1970) (“Ferris Report”) 
28   In rejecting the US model, the Ferris report noted the following: 
(1) There was only one securities market in Singapore, as compared to a number of securities 
markets in US; 
(2) The vast size of the US, its markets, states and history of the securities market made strong 
centralized control important; and 
(3) The SEC has considerable resources of commercial, financial and stock market expertise.  
29  Boon T Tan ‘Forms of Control Exercised Over Securities Industry – A Comparative View’ 
Singapore Stock Exchange Journal, 2 (1974) 5-11 
30  e.g. A Johnston, The City Takeover Code, pp. 82-83 (in the early 1970s, there were allegations 
made that certain companies failed to comply with the spirit of the City Code, which in turn led to 
questions as to the effectiveness of the self-regulatory system). 
31  Boon T Tan, ‘Forms of Control Exercised Over Securities Industry – A Comparative View’ p. 8. 
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modifications were made: first, statutory backing was provided to the SIC32 (which was 
relatively novel since the UK Takeover Panel at that time did not have statutory 
backing);33  second, the companies legislation was amended to provide that directors of 
companies could have regard to the rulings of the SIC in the exercise of their powers. 34 
By legislatively placing the SIC within the central bank and the securities regulator, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, the standing of the SIC in the eyes of the market was 
assured. The secretariat of SIC is staffed by officers of the MAS, and the majority of the 
SIC are mostly from the private sector (with the remaining staff from the public sector). 
 
Thus, the SIC was formed pursuant to the Securities Industry Act 1973,35 and 
continued under the Securities Industry Act 1986 and its successor, the Securities and 
Futures Act. Its legislative role is stated widely, which was to engage in ‘more effective, 
administration, supervision and control of takeover offers and matters connected 
therewith’.36 In 1974, the Takeover Code was introduced.37 While the SIC and the 
Takeover Code have statutory backing, the framework continues to be one of self-
                                                        
32  The terms of reference of the SIC, when set up, were: (a) advising the Minister for Finance on all 
matters affecting the securities industry; (b) advising the Stock Exchange on matters referred to it by the 
Exchange including matters affecting listing requirements and the suspension and delisting of companies; 
(c) recommending to the stock exchange action to be taken to prevent or expose abuses in the securities 
market including unlawful or dishonest forms of trading; (d) advising the Registrar of Companies on the 
activities of suspect companies; and (e) approving applications by companies wishing to raise money by a 
public issue in any form. See SIC Press Statement September 19, 1974, reproduced in Tan PT, at 35.  
33  See Pheng T Tan, Securities Regulation in Singapore and Malaysia, p. 34; and Pheng T Tan, 
‘Review of P.N. Pillai’s Sourcebook of Singapore and Malaysian Company Law’, Malayan Law Review 17 
(1975). 392-397; see also ‘SIC to be an adviser only’, Business Times (12 January 1973). 
34  Hon Sui Sen, Minister for Finance, ‘Securities Industry Bill 1970, Second Reading’, Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, 30 (1970), cols 461-7. 
35  No. 17 of 1973; the SIC was set up by Gazette Notification GN No. S No. S 182 of 1973. 
36  SFA, s 139(2).   
37  Companies Act 1967, s 179. This provision has since been repealed and moved to the SFA.  
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regulation, that is, compliance with the Takeover Code would primarily rest on the bid 
participants and their advisers.38  
 
While a failure to comply with the Takeover Code does not, in itself, render the 
contravening person liable to criminal proceedings, such failure may be relied upon by 
any party to other proceedings (whether civil or criminal) as tending to establish or 
negate any liability which is in question in the proceedings, thus resulting in a 
disincentive for non-compliance with the Takeover Code.39 However, as described 
below, the SIC may invoke sanctions as it may decide in relation to breaches of the 
Takeover Code, including that of public reprimand and withdrawal of facilities.40  
 
Market participants in Singapore have largely accepted the authority of the SIC in 
Singapore. If there is a breach of the Takeover Code, the SIC may issue either a private 
reprimand or public censure. In a flagrant case, further action may be taken, including 
actions designed to deprive the offender temporarily or permanently of its ability to enjoy 
the facilities of the securities market;41 this is also known as ‘cold-shouldering’. 
Professional advisers working in Singapore will not advise a cold-shouldered party. The 
                                                        
38  See SIC, ‘Regulatory Framework, Securities Industry Council and Takeover Code’ in Wan and 
Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore, para 3.15 
39  See Companies Act 1967, s 179(11) and SFA, s 139(8).  
40  See SIC, In the Matter of Jade Technologies Holdings Limited: Grounds of Decision of the Hearing 
committee appointed by the Securities Industry Council (Jade Technologies) (14 October 2008) (“Re Jade 
Technologies”) at ch 6, para [4.3]. The SIC stated that while findings on breaches of the Code may potentially 
overlap with findings of the courts, this should not deter SIC from making findings and imposing sanctions 
when appropriate.  
41  Takeover Code, Introduction, para 2.  
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SIC may also declare a person unsuitable to be a director of a publicly listed company for 
a specified period of time,42 and award compensation orders.43  
 
Although no case has reached the Singapore courts, judicial review is likely to be 
available for SIC decisions. 44 There are important differences in how the SIC functions 
in resolving takeover disputes, as compared to that of a judicial system.45 Unlike the 
courts, the SIC is available for consultation and may give rulings in advance of the case. 
The SIC is also tasked with interpreting the application of the General Principles and the 
rules thereunder, and may grant waivers in appropriate cases. The proceedings are 
informal, private, and dealt with speedily.  
 
2. The Takeover Code 
The Takeover Code comprises General Principles, rules and notes. Nonetheless, 
the Takeover Code notes that it is impracticable to devise rules in sufficient detail to 
cover all circumstances that can arise in takeover and merger transactions. Accordingly, 
both the letter and spirit of the Takeover Code must be observed, especially in 
circumstances not explicitly covered by any Rules.  
 
                                                        
42  In Re Jade Technologies, SIC censured the director and declared him, among other things, to be 
unsuitable to act as a director of a Singapore publicly listed company for a period of five years. 
43  See n 77 below and accompanying text. 
44  Section 139(7) of the SFA provides that ‘The Securities Industry Council may issue rulings on the 
interpretation of the general principles and rules in the Take-over Code and lay down the practice to be 
followed by parties concerned in a take-over offer or a matter connected therewith, and such rulings or 
practice shall be final.’ However, based on recent Singapore decisions on judicial review of other 
administrative findings, such review is likely to be available, despite the word ‘final’ in the SFA. See Wan 
and Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore, paras 16.23-16.25. 
45  See Wan and Varottil, ‘Regulatory Framework, Securities Industry Council and the Takeover 
Code’ in Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore 
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The Takeover Code is strongly geared towards shareholder protection. It has two 
primary aims; the first, to ensure equality of treatment of all shareholders of the same 
class, and the second, to ensure that target shareholders (and not the target board) decides 
the outcome of the bid. As part of the equality rule, the mandatory bid rule46 requires a 
bidder which crosses certain thresholds to make a mandatory bid for all of the remaining 
shares at the price not less than the highest price of the shares acquired during the offer 
and in the preceding specified number of months (currently, and since 2002, six). 
Currently, a mandatory bid is triggered (1) If any acquirer, either on its own or together 
with parties acting in concert with it,47 acquires an interest in 30% or more of the voting 
shares of the target company, or (2) if such an acquirer holds, either on its own or 
together with parties acting in concert with it, between 30% and 50% of voting shares of 
the target company, and acquires additional voting shares representing more than 1% of 
the voting shares in the target company in any six-month period. 
 
The purpose of the mandatory bid rule is to allow the remaining shareholders to 
exit the target company at the price which the bidder paid for upon a change of control of 
the company. The Takeover Code also regulates the kinds of permissible offers, including 
                                                        
46  Takeover Code, r 14.  
47  ‘Parties acting in concert’ comprise individuals or companies who, pursuant to an arrangement or 
understanding (whether formal or informal), cooperate, through the acquisition by any of them of shares in 
a company, to obtain or consolidate effective control of that company. Certain persons are presumed 
(unless the presumption is rebutted) to be acting in concert with each other. They include a company and its 
related and associated companies and companies whose associated companies include any of these 
companies. See Takeover Code, Definition 1. 
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the requirement of comparable offers,48 best price rule,49 restrictions on partial offer50 and 
prohibitions on special deals not extending to other shareholders of the same class.51  
 
The Takeover Code also prohibits the target board frustrating a bona fide bid in 
the absence of shareholder approval; this ‘no frustration’ rule, which has remained 
unchanged from its adoption in 1974, clearly supersedes the common law (and equitable) 
analysis of the duties of the target directors’ duties owed to the company.52 During the 
1999 consultation, the SIC asked whether the US model of takeover regulation, which 
permits the target board to take defensive measures in hostile takeovers, should be 
adopted in Singapore. It was reported that there was a general consensus among the 
market participants for the retention of the UK model, as participants believed that 
shareholders should have the right to determine the outcome of the bid.53  
 
III. LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION AND REASONS FOR THE ENDURING 
INFLUENCE OF THE CITY CODE 
One of the powerful interest groups in Singapore is the major shareholders 
(generally family groups or the state).54 While adopting UK takeover regulation in 1973 
                                                        
48  Takeover Code, r 18. 
49  Takeover Code, rr 14 and 15. 
50  Takeover Code, r 16. 
51  Takeover Code, r 10. 
52  General Principle 2 of the Takeover Code recognises that the freedom of directors to act may be 
limited by the Takeover Code; see also s 159 of the Companies Act which expressly provides that directors 
of a Singapore-incorporated company are entitled to have regard to the Takeover Code and the rulings of 
the SIC in exercising their powers. 
53  1999 Consultation, para 7.  
54  Claessens, Djankov and Lang, ‘The separation of ownership and control in East Asian 
Corporations’, n 8.  
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was a ‘calculated risk’ given the lack of Singapore having a counterpart to the London 
City, the continued relevance of the UK model of takeover regulation is puzzling and 
requires an explanation. Prima face, for shareholders who have significant shareholdings 
but do not control more than 50% of the target, the mandatory bid rule limits their 
flexibility to increase their stake unless they are prepared to make a mandatory bid. The 
mandatory bid rule also may deter bids for the shares held by significant shareholders 
given that they cannot receive a control premium not shared with the other smaller 
shareholders. Further, the no-frustration rule appears to be superfluous if the board is 
itself controlled by the blockholders. Yet, the market participants in the 1999 consultation 
exercise (including the significant interest groups of blockholders and their advisers) 
supported the retention of the UK-style of takeover regulation.  
 
This Part explains the reasons for the continued operation of the UK-style of 
takeover regulation through the perspectives of the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ side of 
takeover regulation. It argues that while the UK takeover regulation appears to be 
designed to encourage hostile takeovers and benefit the smaller dispersed shareholders, 
Singapore’s adoption and variation of the UK-model of takeover regulation has in fact 
been responsive to the interests of blockholders. 
  
1. The influence of blockholders in takeover regulation 
 
(a) The mandatory bid rule 
 
The mandatory bid rule was in the City Code since its inception in 1968. 
Essentially, the rule requires a person and its concert parties who have acquired control of 
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the company to make a bid for the remaining shares at no less than the price which he has 
paid for such control. Between 1968 and 1972, the control threshold in the City Code was 
qualitatively defined as ‘effective control’ and the mandatory bid was triggered if 
directors whose shareholdings effectively controlled the company are selling their shares 
to the buyer. Effective control involved an assessment of the ability of the holder of the 
shares to significantly influence the affairs of the company and conduct them to his 
wishes.55 . In 1972, the mandatory bid rule was changed to include a fixed numerical 
threshold at 40%. In 1974, the qualitative threshold was removed and the mandatory bid 
for the threshold was strictly defined as 30% in 1974;56 at the same time, the creeper 
provision, mandating a mandatory offer if the person and his concert parties held between 
30 to 50% of the shares and acquired 2% in any 12-month period, was introduced. 57 The 
creeper rule was eventually abolished in 1998.58 The rationale for the mandatory bid rule 
is to ensure that minority shareholders are treated equally and have a guaranteed right of 
exit upon a change of control, after a series of scandals where a change of control took 
place and the minority shareholders were not able to share the gains.59  
 
In Singapore, when the Takeover Code was first promulgated in 1974, adopting 
the concept of the quantifiable threshold in the City Code, the mandatory bid threshold 
                                                        
55  See Laurance Rabinowitz (ed.), Weinberg and Blank on Takeovers and Mergers, 5th ed. (Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1989 and Supplement, 2008), para. 4-8004. 
56  See ‘Revised City Code Sets out New Rules on Mandatory Bids’, Times (London) (6 June, 1974), 
p. 19. 
57  See Johnston, The City Takeover Code, pp. 95-96. 
58  In UK, with effect from August 1998, the UK Takeover Panel abolished the creeper provisions of 
rule 9 of the then City Code, which allowed a person who held between 30% to 50% of the voting rights of 
a public company to increase his holding by up to 1% in any 12-month period without having to make a 
mandatory bid for the company under rule 9.  
59  See Armour and Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why’, n 6, pp. 1763-
1764. 
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was fixed at 20%. It is not clear why the threshold was fixed at 20%, given that since 
shareholdings are more concentrated than in the UK, one would expect that the threshold 
would be higher than that in the UK. In 1979, the creeper provision was introduced, 
following the UK which introduced its creeper provision in 1974. The creeper provision 
in Singapore then mandated a mandatory offer if a person and his concert parties held 
20% to 50% of the shareholding and acquired 2% in any 12-month period. 60 The 
mandatory bid threshold and the creeper provision were revised to 25% and 3% in any 
12-month period respectively in 1985.61 After extensive consultation in 1999, a further 
revision was made to 30% and 1% every 6 month period in 2002, which remains till 
today.  
 
The evolution of the mandatory bid rule in Singapore shows how the regulatory 
framework has been responsive to existing blockholders. The progressive increase in the 
mandatory bid threshold from 20% in 1974 to ultimately 30% in 2002 and the decision to 
retain the creeper provision, despite its abolition in the UK in 1998, allows existing 
blockholders to marginally increase their stake in the company without having to make a 
mandatory bid for the remaining shares.  
 
 
(b) No frustration rule 
 
                                                        
60  ‘Sweeping revision in code on takeovers’ Business Times (30 June 1979).  
61  1999 Consultation, para 19 
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In 1999, after extensive consultation, the preference of the market participants 
was to retain the prohibition against frustration of bids in the absence of shareholder 
approval over the US model of takeover regulation which allows the board to block 
unwanted takeovers in certain circumstances. Academic writers, including David 
Kershaw, have argued that the no-frustration rule in the City Code is largely redundant 
because other constraints exist in company law and stock exchange listing rules which 
prevent boards from taking out actions to frustrate bids that would have been permissible 
in the US.62  
  
As in the UK, independent of the Takeover Code, Singapore’s company law and 
stock exchange rules provide similar constraints on the board in erecting takeover 
defences. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine whether the no-frustration rule, 
in itself, is useful in providing protection for shareholders against management 
entrenchment. Suffice to say, while the no-frustration prohibition may not be relevant in 
the context of firms where controlling shareholders have a majority stake, it is unlikely 
that it serves no function in Singapore.  
 
The reason is that majority-controlled companies are not the only forms of 
companies in Singapore. Even among companies that are not regarded as widely held, 
there exists the possibility where there is more than one significant block-holder and none 
of the significant blockholders has majority control. The presence of more than one 
block-holder will make it more difficult for any single blockholder (described as an 
                                                        
62  David Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK's Takeover Defence Prohibition’, 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 56 (2007), 267-307. 
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‘insecure blockholder’ above) to control the board. The data from Claessens et al shows 
that in 1996, 37.6% of the sample companies in Singapore which are not widely held 
have the presence of a single ultimate holder.63 Thus, the data suggests that there remains 
a significant proportion of companies which, though are not regarded as widely held, 
have no single ultimate owner; in these cases, a bidder may still be able to succeed in a 
takeover bid that is opposed by some large shareholders. Thus, the no-frustration rule will 
limit the potential for these large shareholders to procure the board to prevent bona fide 
bids from succeeding, and fills a regulatory gap by benefitting non-controlling 
shareholders, even among companies are not regarded as widely held. The implication is 
that insecure blockholders may still support a rule that places limits on defensive actions 
taken by target management. This may explain why the market participants in 1999 
continued to prefer a model where shareholders are the ultimate deciders on the outcome 
of the takeover bid.  
 
However, while the no-frustration rule may encourage some shifts of control, the 
proportion of Berle and Means-type corporations in Singapore remains very small. In 
fact, Carney et al also show that the proportion of companies where there is absence of a 
single controlling shareholder has declined significantly from 70% in 1996 to 24% to 
2008.64 This signifies that the listed companies in Singapore are in fact becoming more 
concentrated. Part IV discusses the implication of these findings.  
                                                        
63  Claessens et al define single ultimate holders as a shareholder who has majority control or who 
holds at least 10% and where there is no second shareholder holding at least 10%. There are 221 companies 
in the sample.  
64  Richard Carney and Travers B Child, ‘Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian 
corporations between 1996 and 2008: The primacy of politics’ Journal of Financial Economics 107 (2013) 
494-513. 
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2. The Regulator – Securities Industry Council 
The endurance of the SIC has not only been due to its speed and flexibility in 
dealing with takeover disputes but also its ability and function to prioritise public interest 
over parties’ private interests. The SFA expressly provides that the SIC may, in 
discharging its functions, have regard to ‘the interest of the public [and] the protection of 
investors’. 65 In 1973, the choice of self-regulation was made over an independent 
regulatory body like the SEC. Once the SIC was in place, together with the nature and 
structure of the Takeover Code, the speed and manner in which SIC has acted in takeover 
disputes has pre-empted calls for legislative or other regulatory intervention. This has 
also led to the channelling of cases away from the courts as the primary place for the 
resolution of takeover disputes. The following sets out illustrative examples of the SIC’s 
rulings.  
(a) Public interest versus private ordering 
 
Since 2000, there is a far greater emphasis by the SIC on market certainty and 
facilitating orderliness in the market, partly due to the fact that the markets were far less 
stable post-2001 terrorist attacks and the global financial crisis that started in 2007. This 
policy has translated to the SIC having a strong interest in ensuring offers that are 
announced being effected, unless defeated on regulatory grounds or any failure of the 
acceptance condition being fulfilled.  
 
                                                        
65  SFA, s 138(9). 
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The following examples demonstrate the SIC’s interests in ensuring that the 
Takeover Code will prevail in two situations involving potential conflicts between the 
Takeover Code and contract law and the Takeover Code and company law respectively. 
 
(1) Conflict between the Takeover Code and contract law 
 
The situation involving bespoke and negotiated conditions provides an illustrative 
example of how priority is given to certainty and predictability, which may indirectly 
affect the party’s strict legal position under contract law.  
 
Once a bidder announces an intention to make an offer, the question often arises 
as to whether it can then not make the offer or terminate the offer on the ground of non-
fulfilment of a condition. As a matter of contract law, if the offer is expressed to be 
conditional upon the fulfilment of a bespoke or negotiated condition (for example the net 
tangible asset value not being less than $100 million), any non-fulfilment will, in itself, 
be a sufficient ground to withdraw the offer. However, if a bidder is readily permitted to 
withdraw an offer, there may be grave uncertainty to the market because it is often not 
clear to minority shareholders whether a particular bespoke or negotiated condition will 
be fulfilled.  
 
Under the Takeover Code, SIC’s approval is required for the withdrawal of an 
offer and its approval is given only if the circumstances giving rise to such withdrawal 
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are not material in the context of the offer within rule 15.66 In theory, the SIC only 
determines whether the offer can be withdrawn in the context of the Takeover Code and 
does not determine the contractual rights of the parties. However, in a prior work, this 
author has argued that the risk of inconsistency between the application of the provisions 
relating to bespoke conditions by the court (using contract law) and by the SIC is very 
real. Taking the case of the Singapore takeover of Mentor Media by Banta by way of a 
scheme of arrangement in 2002, there was a specific bespoke condition precedent in the 
implementation agreement, that is, the net tangible asset value of Mentor Media should 
not be below S$37.5 million. After the scheme of arrangement was announced but before 
the shareholders’ scheme meeting was held, Banta took the view the NTA was below 
S$37.5 million and it was entitled to terminate the implementation agreement. Mentor 
Media disagreed, principally on the ground that the NTA requirement would be fulfilled 
by the date of completion of the scheme. When SIC ruled that Banta could not withdraw 
the offer, Banta proceeded to sue Mentor Media in the High Court for a declaration that 
the termination was valid. The matter was eventually settled out of court, with Banta 
paying S$8 million to Mentor Media.  
 
The Mentor Media saga shows that even when the parties to the transaction have 
reached a commercial, negotiated agreement on what they consider to be the material, 
break-away thresholds of the transaction, it is still susceptible to being overridden by the 
SIC’s discretion in not allowing the relevant condition to be invoked. As argued in a 
previous work, the reasons are founded on market certainty and orderly conduct, and that 
                                                        
66  See discussion in Wai Y Wan, ‘Invoking Protective Conditions to Terminate Public Mergers and 
Acquisitions Transactions’ Journal of Business Law (2011), 64-90. 
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takeovers which have been announced should be completed unless they fail for regulatory 
reasons or fail to garner the requisite acceptances.67 
 
The refusal of the SIC to allow the withdrawal of an offer has an important 
implication on the takeover process and indirectly the substantive rights of the parties. 
Even if the bidder were to litigate the matter in court, it is unlikely that the Singapore 
court would intervene to grant an injunction to allow the bidder to withdraw the offer. 
English case law has made it clear that irrespective of the parties’ legal positions as to the 
right to withdraw an offer, the court should not generally intervene in an ongoing 
takeover, and following ex parte Datafin,68 the court will defer to the regulatory primacy 
of the Takeover Code (or its equivalent) and the SIC (or its equivalent), and will not 
suspend the bidder’s obligations to complete the transaction in accordance with the time-
table under the Takeover Code. In such a case, while the bidder is not precluded from 
bringing litigation for damages (as the no-frustration principle applies only to the target 
board), the bidder will still be bound to complete the transaction in accordance with the 
fixed time-table set by the Takeover Code.  
 
Even if the matter is ultimately heard at trial and the court reaches a different 
decision from the SIC, it will be too late for the bidder to unwind the acquisition once the 
                                                        
67  See above. The principles have also been recently affirmed in in connection with the appeal of the 
ruling in respect of whether an offeror, CGNPC-URC, could reduce the offer price of Kalahari shares, after 
it had made an indicative offer; the City Code allows a reduction only in ‘wholly exceptional’ 
circumstances, and the Panel ruled that market integrity requires there to be certainty and orderly conduct, 
which prevails over the apparent advantages in allowing the price reduction, even if the target board 
consents to such reduction: see Takeover Panel Hearings Committee, ‘Reasons for the Hearings 
Committee’s decision’ (PS 11/2011).  
68  R v The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815.  
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acquisition is completed. In such a case, the bidder only has a paper victory. Thus, the 
process of takeover regulation has substantive consequences on the legal rights of the 
parties.  
 
(2) Conflict between the Takeover Code and company law 
The second illustrative example of the SIC’s prioritising certainty and 
predictability over the parties’ strict legal rights arises where there is a conflict between 
the Takeover Code and company law.  
 
There is no issue if the conflict is between the Takeover Code and Singapore 
company law. If there is conflict between the duties faced by a bidder or target of a 
Singapore-incorporated company under the Takeover Code (such as in respect of the no-
frustration rule) and its duties at common law (including equitable principles), the board 
of the Singapore-incorporated company is statutorily obliged to give precedence to the 
Takeover Code under the Companies Act.69 The position is similar to that reached in the 
UK, even prior to the UK putting the City Code or the Takeover Panel on a statutory 
footing. In charting the history of the City Code, Sir Andrew Johnston noted the concerns 
by the UK City solicitors that the no-frustration rule in City Code could be inconsistent 
with the general obligations of directors under company law.70 The UK Panel assesses the 
board’s actions based on their objective effect, while the courts will assess the propriety 
of the board’s actions based on whether the board has in fact exercised the decision for a 
proper purpose, which has subjective elements. The response to the conflict was that the 
                                                        
69  Companies Act, s 159. 
70  See Johnston, The City Takeover Code, n 21, pp. 147-148. 
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City Code was intended to restrict the actions of the boards of the target and the bidder, 
as provided by the general principle which expressly states that the actions of the boards 
of the bidder or target in the takeovers in respect of the offer to the target shareholders 
may be impinged upon. Sir Johnston argued that while there were several situations in the 
1970s where there were potential conflicts between the City Code and the rulings of the 
courts, in none of these cases was there any judicial ruling which nullified the operation 
of the City Code.71  
 
 
However, what if the director of a foreign-incorporated company faces conflicting 
obligations under the Takeover Code and his duties as a director under the company law 
                                                        
71  The examples given were: (i) Guest, Keen & Nettlefold/ Miles Druce, where the UK Panel 
required the directors of the target to obtain shareholder approval before it could appeal to the European 
Court on the decisions of the Commission in allowing a hostile bidder to go ahead, this became moot when 
the bidder made market purchases so as to acquire control of the target; (ii) Ashbourne, where a 
shareholder of one member of the consortium bidder (C) started proceedings in the court to prevent C from 
bidding until shareholder approval of C was obtained, and the consortium bidder sued the vendors of the 
shares, claiming recession on the ground of misrepresentation; the consortium brought an injunction against 
the UK Panel, preventing it from issuing any director that restricts the consortium’s exercise of voting 
rights. The High Court refused the injunction; (iii) Babcok & Wilcox/Herbert Morris, where the target 
sought an injunction in the US courts on anti-trust grounds against the bidder who incurred a mandatory bid 
but the longer-term injunction was eventually refused; (iv) Johnson & Firth/ Dunford & Elliot, where the 
target sought an injunction against a bidder, claiming unauthorised use of its information but the injunction 
was subsequently discharged by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the injunction would not preserve 
the status quo; and (v) Graff Diamonds, a case where a party informed the UK Panel that legal proceedings 
were contemplated against the newspaper. The High Court allowed the UK Panel to proceed with 
investigations regarding the newspaper article, but did not allow its findings to be published, pending the 
conclusion of the action against the newspaper. See Johnston, The City Takeover Code, n 21, ch XII.  
 
It was also reported that a ruling of the UK Panel was in direct conflict with the legal or equitable 
rights of third parties not involved in the takeover. See Geoffrey Morse, ‘Controlling Takeovers – The Self-
Regulation Option in the United Kingdom’, Journal of Business Law (1998) 58-74 (referring to the 1995 
decision of the UK Panel in respect of British Land Company’s offer for Stanhope Properties, which owned 
50% of a dead-locked joint venture company, Broadgate Properties. The other joint venturer of Broadgate 
Properties, R, argued that British Land should offer for all of the remaining shares of Broadgate Properties, 
on the basis of the chain principle. By ruling that there was no obligation to make an offer for the remaining 
shares, the UK Panel potentially abrogated the rights of R, to whom Stanhope (now controlled by British 
Land Company) might have owed fiduciary duties towards. 
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of the place of incorporation? An interesting situation arose in the takeover offer by 
Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc (“M-Flex”) for MFS Technology Ltd (“MFS”) but the 
matter was eventually overtaken by other events and no ruling was formally published. In 
2006, M-Flex, a Delaware company listed on NASDAQ, announced its intention to make 
a pre-conditional offer to acquire MFS, a Singapore company listed on SGX. WBL held 
approximately 61% and 56% of M-Flex and MFS respectively. In connection with the 
transaction, WBL gave an irrevocable undertaking that subject to the approval of its 
shareholders, it would vote its M-Flex shares in favour of the transaction and accept the 
offer in relation to its MFS shares.  
 
Subsequent to the announcement of the pre-conditional offer, M-Flex alleged that 
MFS had suffered significant declines in its businesses,72 and that M-Flex’s assumptions 
of MFS’ revenue and net income were shown to be inaccurate. The board of M-Flex 
withdrew its recommendation and approval of the offer, on the ground of compliance 
with its own fiduciary duties owed under Delaware law. M-Flex applied to the SIC to 
withdraw its pre-conditional offer. The SIC refused to allow M-Flex to withdraw. M-Flex 
brought actions in the Delaware Chancery Court for a declaration that it was entitled to 
withdraw the offer because of fiduciary duties that the board owed under Delaware law. 
M-Flex also brought actions against WBL, arguing that WBL owed fiduciary duties to 
the minority shareholders of M-Flex under Delaware law not to exercise the irrevocable 
undertaking. The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the case on the ground that the 
                                                        
72  M-Flex argued that the net sales declined by 8%, gross profits declined by 48% and net income had 
declined by 85% for the third quarter of its 2006 fiscal year, compared to the comparable periods in the 
previous year. See Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc, ‘Form S-4/A’, filed on 19 March 2007 at p. 72. 
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question was moot because by the time the matter was heard, the irrevocable undertaking 
of WBL had expired.73 Ultimately, a subsequent attempt by WBL to obtain the approval 
of its shareholders for the proposed transaction was rejected by the shareholders.74  
 
On these facts, the SIC’s ruling appears correct because the relevant negotiated 
condition in that case was the net assets test, and it was not alleged that the net assets of 
the target had fallen below the contractual threshold. However, key important questions 
remain open. In particular, is there an obligation on the part of the board of M-Flex75 to 
proceed with the offer under the Takeover Code, even if the board of M-Flex faces a 
conflict between their compliance of the Takeover Code and their fiduciary duties under 
Delaware law? The case was thus an interesting interface between the supremacy of the 
Takeover Code and the foreign domestic law governing the duties of directors. It is not 
easy to argue before the SIC that foreign law on fiduciary obligations should prevail over 
Takeover Code.  
 
 (2) Flexibility of remedies 
When there is a breach or non-compliance of the Takeover Code, the SIC has a 
range of remedies at its disposal, including issuing reprimands to, or withdrawing 
facilities of the securities market from, the offending company and individuals (known as 
cold-shoulder orders). The SIC may disqualify a director from acting as a director of a 
                                                        
73  Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc v WBL Corporation Limited (2007) Del Ch LEXI 21. 
74   ‘M-Flex Announces WBL Shareholders Vote Against Accepting The MFS Technology Offer’, PR 
Newswire (26 June 2007).  
75  Section 159 of the Companies Act does not apply to M-Flex, which is a foreign corporation.  
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publicly listed company.76 The SIC can also make orders against the professional 
advisers. If there is a breach of the mandatory bid rule, the SIC can compel the party who 
triggered the bid to pay compensation. 77 The recent amendments to the Takeover Code in 
2012 made it clear that SIC may also order compensation to be paid to shareholders or 
former shareholders by persons who have contravened other provisions of the Takeover 
Code, apart from rule 14 (relating to the mandatory bid rule).  
 
More importantly, the SIC is able to make orders that are tailored to the situation 
at hand speedily or otherwise provides oversight to the parties to take actions that remedy 
the non-compliance. There are a number of examples. In a non-mandatory bid situation, 
the SIC has allowed the bidder to withdraw an offer where it is clear that the offending 
party is not able to complete the bid.78 Where it appears that independent advice may be 
perceived to be compromised, the SIC has ordered that a second independent financial 
adviser be appointed.79 Where a party is seeking to be released from a no-increase 
statement in circumstances where it has not expressly reserved the right to do so or in the 
absence of a competitive situation, the bidder was allowed to be so released in exchange 
for the target board’s recommendation, subject to paying compensation to those 
shareholders who had traded in reliance on the no increase statement.80  
                                                        
76  See e.g. Re Jade Technologies.  
77  e.g. ‘SIC orders Apollo chairman to pay shareholders’, Business Times (30 August 1997). The 
offer ordered by the SIC was launched on 5 January 1998; ‘Announcement: Compensation by Mr. Ng Kim 
Suan to Eligible Shareholders and Warrantholders of Apollo Enterprises Limited’ Straits Times (5 January 
1998). 
78  e.g. Re Jade Technologies.  
79  e.g. S Ng, ‘Don’t interfere with choice of IFAs in takeovers – regulator’ Business Times (8 August 
2002) (describing the takeover of Overseas Union Trust when the second IFA was appointed).  
80  Natsteel, ‘Voluntary conditional cash offer by Standard Chartered Bank, for and on behalf of 98 
Holdings Pte Ltd to acquire all the issued ordinary shares of $0.50 each in the capital of Natsteel Ltd’ (13 
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Generally, market participants have complied with the orders of the SIC. 81 Where 
the bidder is not in a position to make the mandatory offer,  the SIC has facilitated a 
process by which the bidder’s existing shares are used as consideration to settle the 
compensation to the minority shareholders.82  
 
Consistent with the goal of resolving uncertainty speedily and decisively, and yet 
preserving the right of the shareholders to receive bids, the SIC has issued a ‘put up or 
shut up notice’ to potential bidders to resolve uncertainty as to whether a bid is to be 
made.83 Such a bidder must either declare a bid or be prevented from making a bid for the 
next six months.84 The SIC has also administered an auction to determine which bid 
would prevail where there are competitive bids for the same target. 85 
 
As is the case of the UK Takeover Panel, the SIC has acted proactively in 
response to developments in takeovers. The range of orders that the SIC makes has 
                                                        
November 2002), copy on file with author; see also SIC, ‘Consultation Conclusions on the Revision of the 
Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers’ (15 March 2007), at para 18. 
81  The situation may be contrasted with Hong Kong where the takeover panels have not made 
mandatory offers where there are insufficient financial resources. Executive Decision, ‘SFC publicly 
censures Capital VC Limited and Yau Chung Hong in relation to a breach of the mandatory offer 
obligation in the Takeovers Code in respect of Longlife Group Holdings Limited. The SFC has also 
imposed a cold shoulder order against Mr Yau for a period of 18 months’ (20 May 2012); Executive 
Decision, ‘SFC Sanctions Raffles International Holdings Limited and Lai Kam Wing Jimmy in relation 
to a Breach of the Takeovers Code Concerning Dealings in Shares in FT Holdings International 
Limited’ (29 January 2003). 
 
82  See SIC, ‘Serial System’ (12 October 2001).  
83  e.g. SIC, ‘Public Statement on Parkway Holdings’ (16 June 2010); SIC, ‘Public Statement on 
Sanion Enterprises’ (19 November 2002). 
84  Takeover Code, rule 33. 
85  e.g. SIC, ‘Public Statement on Competitive Situation in relation to Fraser and Neave’ (15 January 
2013). 
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ensured that it is able to resolve disputes speedily and to minimize uncertainty in the 
market. The SIC also reviews developments in other jurisdictions in determining whether 
amendments to the Takeover Code are necessary.86 These actions and SIC’s track record 
have thus far pre-empted calls to legislatively intervene in other matters. 
 
IV. EFFECT OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION ON SHAREHOLDING 
STRUCTURES AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL  
 
1. Differences in shareholding structures 
Consistent with many Asian jurisdictions, listed firms in Singapore are highly 
concentrated, with the state and families being the predominant controlling shareholders. 
Empirical studies (unpublished) have reported the high concentration of the shareholdings 
in these groups of shareholders in listed firms in Singapore in the 1960s. 87  Post-
promulgation of the Takeover Code in 1974, the shareholdings remain concentrated in 
families and the state. 88 Two of the first comprehensive (and published) studies were done 
by La Porta et al. 89 and Claessens et al.90 La Porta, who investigated the control structure 
                                                        
86  e.g. 1999 Consultation Paper; 2001 Consultation Paper. 
87  See Watt M Tay, ‘Ownership and Control of the Singapore Public Companies, (1940-1962)’ 
University of Singapore, Department of Economics, (1963-64), whose study of 66 listed companies in 1963 
showed that for 77.3% of the 66 companies, the largest 20 shareholders in each case held in aggregate more 
than 50% of the votes.  
88  A study on the ownership and control of among others, six publicly-listed banks in Singapore, in 
the late 1970s also demonstrates the high concentration of these banks in the hands of families and 
directors. Of the six banks, four of them have directors whose deemed shareholdings represent 22% to 41% 
of the voting rights, one has directors whose shareholdings represent 9% of the voting rights and the last is 
49.4% held by the state. See Sheng Y Lee, ‘Ownership and Control of Local Banks’ Business Times, (24 
February 1981).  
89  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership Around 
the World’, Journal of Finance 54 (1999), 471-518. 
90  Claessens, Djankov and Lang, ‘The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations’ 
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of firms in 27 countries in the early 1990s and found that for Singapore, 45% of large91 
publicly traded firms were controlled92 by the state, 45% by families and 5% were widely 
held; the data was obtained from a sample of the 20 top companies by market capitalization 
as at 1995. In comparison, the averages across the 27 countries were 20%, 35% and 25% 
respectively. Claessens et al, in their study of shareholding structures of nine East Asian 
countries (including Singapore) reported that the corresponding percentages for state, 
family and widely held firms were 21.8%, 53.3% and 2.5% respectively as of 1996 (based 
on a sample size of 200 firms).  
 
A separate study on listed firms in Singapore as at 1995 showed that mean and 
median total ownership by substantial shareholders (owning 5% of more the voting 
shares) was more than 60%.93  
 
This pattern of concentration is also demonstrated in more recent studies. A study 
in 2011 on 743 listed companies on SGX shows that the average top 20 ownership 
concentration is 80.5% for family firms and 76.1% for non-family firms.94 On average, 
families owned a 39.9% stake among the top 20 owners and 38.3% among the top five 
owners.  
                                                        
91  These are the top 20 firms ranked by market capitalization of common equity at the end of 1995. 
92  Using 10 percent of voting rights as the criterion for control. 
93  See Yuen T Mak and Yuan Li, ‘Determinants of corporate ownership and board structure: 
evidence from Singapore’ Journal of Corporate Finance 7 (2001) 235-256. 
94 Marleen Dieleman, Jungwook Shim and Muhammad Ibrahim, ‘Asian Family Firms: Success and 
Succession; A Study of SGX –listed Family Firms’, Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organisations, 
National University of Singapore Business School and DBS (2011), available at 
bschool.nus.edu/Portals/0/images/CGIO/Report/Asian%20Family%20Business%20Report.pdf. Family 
firms are defined in their study as firms where the founders or co-founders of their respective family 
members are present among the 20 largest shareholders or as board members.  
 35 
 
 
A more recent study by Carney et al95 of nine East Asian countries on 
shareholdings in 2008, 96 which compares with the data from Claessens et al (described 
above),  reported that the corresponding percentages for state, family and widely held 
firms were 20.5%, 60.2% and 8.4% respectively as of 2008 (for 131 firms), which 
compares with 21.8%, 53.3% and 2.5% respectively as of 1996 (for 200 firms). Thus, 
while there is an increase in widely held firms, the state and families still continue to 
dominate, the listed firms in Singapore, with families showing a larger increase in 
concentration. 97  
 
Carney et al also reports a large increase (from 30.1% to 75.9%) in the sample of 
companies of 2008 that are not widely held to have single ultimate owners, as compared 
to those of 1996.98 Pyramid structures also declined significantly between 1996 and 
2006.99 
  
The empirical evidence on increase in concentration of shareholdings between 
1996 and 2008 should be viewed in the context of the changes in the stock exchange 
framework that took place during that period. Prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, it 
                                                        
95  Carney and B Child, ‘Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian corporations between 
1996 and 2008: The primacy of politics’.  
96  The nine East Asian countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
97  Carney et al shows that between 1996 and 2008, the family and state dominated firms constituted 
29 and 10 out of newly listed firms, compared to 9 widely held firm.  
98  Cf Claessens et al, n 63 reports 37.6% of the companies having single ultimate controlling 
shareholders for a larger sample size.  
99  The decline is 68.2% in 1996 to 22.7% in 2006.  
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was reported that there were approximately 30 listed companies (mostly blue chip 
companies) had foreign shareholding limits ranging from 20% to 49%, which were either 
imposed by statute or voluntarily.100 As at 1998, 12 of these companies traded in local 
and foreign tranches (which occurred once the foreign shareholding limits were 
reached).101 Foreign shareholding limits had prevented control of the companies from 
falling into the hands of foreign investors. However, it has been demonstrated empirically 
that such limits are costly to the shareholders as they impede a change of control.102 By 
2002, most of the companies had removed their foreign shareholding limits and merged 
the foreign and local tranches.103 The removal of these limits should have led to an 
increase in the separation of ownership and control; however, the reverse has occurred.  
 
These findings may be contrasted with the UK, which has had the mandatory bid 
rule since 1968.104 In UK, it has been documented that ownership began to separate from 
control since 1940s due to various factors including taxation policies that favour the exit 
of blockholders and policies inducing institutional shareholders to buy shares.105 With the 
promulgation of the City Code, acquirers tend to acquire just less than 30% so that they 
                                                        
100  See Yuen T Mak and Phillip Phan, ‘Corporate Governance in Singapore: Current Practice and 
Future Developments’, OECD Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective 
(1999) at 385. The data by Carney et al captures the largest 200 companies by capitalization. Most, if not 
all, of the companies that had the foreign and local tranches (which tended to be the largest companies) 
would have fallen within the largest 200 companies by capitalisation.  
101  Swee S Lam, ‘Control Can Be Costly: A Lesson To Learn About Imposing Restrictions on 
Foreign Share Ownership’, Faculty of Business Administration Working Papers, National University of 
Singapore (1997) 
102  Swee S Lam, ‘Restrictions on Foreign Share Ownership and its Impact on Market Capitalisation 
and Liquidity’ Stock Exchange of Singapore Journal 23 (1995), 4-11.  
103  In May 1999, MAS lifted the 40% foreign shareholding limits for Singapore-incorporated banks. 
The limit of 20% was lifted for Singapore-incorporated finance companies in 2002. 
104  Rabinowitz (ed.), Weinberg and Blank on Takeovers and Mergers, para. 4-8005. 
105  See Brian Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control (Oxford University Press, 2008), ch 9. 
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can exercise de facto control without triggering the mandatory bid rule.106 The mandatory 
bid rule also explains, at least partially, why few shareholders of UK listed companies 
have block shareholdings beyond the 30% mark.107  
 
Thus, there is evidence that for companies which begin with fairly dispersed 
shareholdings, the mandatory bid rule has tended to reinforce the separation of ownership 
and control. In Singapore, where shareholdings of companies are highly concentrated, we 
have empirical data which shows an increase in concentration in shareholdings during the 
period 1996 to 2008. While we do not have direct empirical data to show the impact on 
shareholdings as a result of the promulgation of the mandatory bid rule in the Takeover 
Code in 1974, the mandatory bid rule (together with its exceptions) has not resulted in a 
similar greater dispersion in shareholdings; in fact the rule may even reinforce the 
concentration of shareholdings in a stable investment climate (as the past few decades 
have been for Singapore). The reason is that acquirers lack the incentives to make bids 
exceeding the mandatory bid threshold since they cannot offer premium prices to 
blockholders without sharing such price with minority shareholders, making acquisitions 
more expensive for acquirers. This experience is not unique to Singapore. Other countries 
have undergone a similar experience. In the case of Italy, where public companies are 
characterised by concentrated shareholdings, there has been an increase in the number of 
                                                        
106  See F Barca and M Becht, The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
12, 36, 280. 
107  See John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘The Berle-Means Corporation in the 21st century’; Yale 
Law School Working Papers available at 
https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/Armour_BerleMeansCorp091021.p
df (accessed 30 June 2016), at p. 18.  
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companies holding between 30 to 50% shareholdings, and no significant rise in dispersed 
ownership since the adoption of the mandatory takeover bid rule in 1997.108  
 
At this juncture, it should be pointed out that this paper does not make the claim 
that abolishing the mandatory bid rule will result in greater diffusion in shareholding. 
Rather it makes the claim that the adoption of the UK model in a jurisdiction with 
concentrated shareholdings will not promote diffusion in the shareholding; on the 
contrary, it may even result in further concentration of shareholdings. This increase in 
concentration of shareholdings cannot be explained by suggesting that other aspects of 
the law and regulation unique to Singapore favour controlling blockholders; Singapore 
shares a similar approach of regulating blockholders with the UK. Both the UK and 
Singapore have similar (though not identical) rules in the companies’ legislation and 
listing rules regarding the disclosure of blockholdings.109 Both also have similar legal 
constraints on corporate insiders and controlling shareholders in gaining disproportionate 
benefits of private control at the expense of minority shareholders.110  
 
2. Market for corporate control 
(a) Hostile v friendly bids 
                                                        
108  Marco Ventoruzzo, ‘Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Taking UK Rules to 
Continental Europe’ U Penn Journal of Business Law 11 (2008) 135-174. 
109  In Singapore, SFA, s 135-7 (requiring disclosure of substantial shareholding, that is shareholding 
of 5% or more). In UK, the threshold is 3%.  
110  In Singapore, chapter 9 of the SGX listing rules require shareholder approval for transactions with 
interested persons (defined as including directors and controlling shareholders) whose percentage ratio is 
5% or greater of the net tangible asset value (NTA) of the target and disclosure if the percentage ratio is 3% 
of the NTA. Similarly, the FSA Listing Rules 11 requires shareholder approval for transactions with related 
parties (defined as including directors and shareholders holding at least 10%) unless they are exempted 
(such as small transaction where the relevant percentage ratio based on assets, profits, consideration to 
market capital and gross capital is less than 0.25%).  
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Table 1 contains the data for public takeovers of Singapore and UK listed firms for 
the period 2000 to 2014. The overwhelming majority of the deals in UK and Singapore 
proceed by way of friendly bids. UK has comparatively more hostile bids (defined as an 
unsolicited offer that is resisted by target management) and unsolicited bids than 
Singapore.111 Thus, for those who argue that the disciplinary effect of hostile takeovers 
on management is good for the market,112 the implementation of UK-style takeover 
regulation has not led to such disciplinary effect in Singapore. 
  
                                                        
111  The significant contested bids between 2000 to 2014 were found in companies where there was 
more than one controlling blockholder, including the takeover offers for (1) OUB by DBS and UOB in 
2001; (2) NatSteel by 98 Holdings and Oei Hong Leong in 2002; (3) Parkway Holdings by Khazanah and 
Fortis in 2010; (4) Portek International by Mitsui and International Container Terminal Services in 2011 (5) 
Fraser & Neave by Thai Beverage and OUE in 2012; (6) Straits Trading by Lee and Teticity in 2008; and 
(7) WBL by Straits Trading and United Engineers in 2013. 
112  See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, pp. 171-73 
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Table 1: M&A deals announced for the period 2000 - 2014 (inclusive) for targets 
listed in Singapore and UK113 
  
Singapore    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Location of 
target 
Total 
number 
of deals  
Friendly % of (1) Hostile and 
Unsolicited 
% of (1) Neutral % of (1) 
Singapore 
(Mainboard 
and 
Catalist)  
1400 1084 77.4 5 0.4 311 22.2 
UK 
(Mainboard 
and AIM) 
4371 3739 85.5 166 3.8 466 10.7 
  
(b) Going private transactions 
Going private or privatisation transactions refer to transactions in which an 
acquirer can compulsorily acquire 100% of the target, even if there are dissenting 
shareholders who do not wish to sell. Where the acquirer is an existing controlling 
shareholder of the target, it can extract private benefits of control by compelling the 
minority shareholders to sell to it at a coercive offer price that reflects the discount to the 
private benefits of control obtainable by holding 100% of the target.114  
 
                                                        
113  Source: Table 1 report figures on M&A activity from 2000 to 2014 (inclusive) taken from SDC 
Platinum, a subscription based service. The tables show the attitude of the target board. SDC Platinum 
characterizes the deals as friendly, neutral, unsolicited, hostile and not applicable. Column (1) shows the 
total number of M&A deals in Singapore and UK respectively where the deal attitude is relevant. Those 
which are characterised as not applicable (such as privately negotiated acquisitions of less than 30%) are 
excluded. Columns (2) and (3) show the number, and percentage, respectively, of these transactions that 
were friendly. Columns (4) and (5) show the number, and percentage, respectively of these transactions that 
were hostile and unsolicited. Column (5) and (6) show the number, and percentage, respectively of these 
transactions that were neutral.  
114  See Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Controlling Controlling Shareholders’ University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 152 (2003), 785-843 at p. 796. 
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Many jurisdictions, including UK and Singapore, recognise that there are benefits 
in allowing acquirers to obtain 100% of the target. Similar to the UK, companies in 
Singapore may be privatised via: (1) a scheme of arrangement under section 210 of the 
Companies Act; or (2) a general offer followed by compulsory acquisition under section 
215 of the Companies Act or its equivalent under the relevant law of incorporation. In the 
case of a scheme of arrangement under section 210 or a compulsory acquisition under 
section 215, where the acquirer is the controlling shareholder, the target shares of the 
acquirer cannot count towards the shareholder approval threshold.  
 
Existing controlling shareholders seeking to take the company private may choose 
to effect the delisting of the target company in conjunction with a general offer (also 
known as an exit offer); the delisting of the target would normally induce shareholders to 
accept its offer, even if they are of the view that the offer price under-values the 
company, lest they end up with shares of a delisted company. This will often be followed 
by a compulsory acquisition if, post-offer, over 90% of shares are controlled by the 
acquirer.  
 
The requirement for a delisting in Singapore is the approval of 75% of the total 
number of issued shares of the company held by shareholders present and voting on a 
poll, and not opposed by shareholders holding 10% or more of the total number of issued 
shares present and voting on a poll.115 The delisting must also be accompanied by an exit 
offer, which is normally in cash.116 Unlike a scheme of arrangement or a compulsory 
acquisition, the votes of controlling shareholders, including those making the exit offer, 
can count towards the approval threshold for the delisting resolution.  
 
                                                        
115  SGX listing rules, r. 1307. 
116  SGX listing rules, r. 1309. 
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In UK, the processes and approvals thresholds for achieving the scheme of 
arrangement and compulsory acquisition are similar to Singapore.117 However, the 
delisting criteria in the two jurisdictions are not identical. In UK, for Mainboard 
companies, prior to May 2014, acquirers which achieve 75% of the target pursuant to a 
takeover offer can then effect a cancellation of listing with the appropriate notice. 
Otherwise, a withdrawal of listing requires a special resolution of the shareholders, 
present and voting. In May 2014, the listing rules118 were amended and an acquirer, 
which has more than 50% of the target and is seeking to withdraw the premium listing 
after its takeover offer of the target upon reaching 75%, must also obtain acceptances 
from the majority of the minority shareholders. 119 (The May 2014 amendments allows 
the majority of the minority shareholders to be disapplied if an existing controlling 
shareholder achieves 80% shareholding of the target after a takeover offer. However, this 
disapplication exception was removed in January 2016.)120 In a non-takeover situation, an 
issuer would require approval of 75% of the shareholders, present and voting.  Where 
there is a controlling shareholder, it has to be separately approved by a majority of the 
votes held by the independent shareholders.121 
 
                                                        
117  UK Companies Act 2006 Part 26 and Part 28, Chapter 3, respectively 
118  FSA Listing Rules 5.2.11D. The rules were amended to provide greater protection for minority 
shareholders in controlled companies, in light of the corporate governance scandals surrounding these 
companies, such as Bumi (now renamed Asia Mineral Resources), Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation 
(now de-listed) and Essar Energy; see Roger Barker and Iris Chiu, ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders in 
Blockholder-Controlled Companies – Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in Comparison with 
Investor Protection Regimes in New York and Hong Kong’ Capital Markets Law Journal 10 (2014) 98-
132. 
119  Listing rules, rule 5.2.11A.  
120  FSA Listing Rules 5.2.11D. The FCA found that this disapplication had "potentially significant 
consequential and unintended implications for investor protection". If an offeror already held 80% of the 
issuer's voting share capital, it had the ability to cancel the issuer's listing without either independent 
shareholder approval or its offer being accepted by any independent shareholders.  
121  Listing rules, rule 5.2.5 R. 
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For AIM companies, issuers which wish to cancel their listings must obtain the 
consent of at least 75% of the shareholders given at a general meeting.122 One of the 
exceptions is where there is a takeover which has become wholly unconditional and the 
offeror has received valid acceptances in excess of 75%. If an AIM company is subject to 
a takeover offer and the acceptance condition is stipulated at less than 75%, the holders of 
the AIM company’s shares will still be required to pass a vote of at least 75% in favour of 
cancellation of its AIM admission. 123 
 
 The delisting rules found in UK for the Mainboard companies are generally more 
favourable to minority shareholders. Even pre-May 2014, the acquirer of an UK target 
must achieve acceptances and holdings amounting to 75% before it can commence the 
delisting process. The lack of response on the part of passive or untraceable shareholders 
will work against the acquirer. In Singapore, the threshold for approval of the delisting 
proposal is 75% with not more than 10% voting against, of shareholders present and 
voting. In such a case, lack of response on the part of passive or untraceable shareholders 
will work in favour of the acquirer. Post-January 2016, a UK acquirer, being an existing 
controller, who achieves 75% acceptances or holdings must obtain acceptances from the 
majority of the minority shareholders; there is no requirement to seek independent 
minority shareholder support in Singapore.  
 
 While the UK delisting rules for Mainboard companies will still not completely 
protect minority shareholders from coercive offers which materially undervalue the 
                                                        
122  London Stock Exchange, AIM Rules for Companies, rule 41.  
123  AIM: issue 5 of Inside AIM newsletter (October 2015). 
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target, the free float requirement on the London Stock Exchange of 25%124, higher than 
the SGX’s requirement of 10%, makes it more unlikely for the controlling shareholder to 
obtain the approvals without having made a sufficiently attractive offer.  
 
While it is too early to note the impact of the amendment to the listing rules in the 
UK for Mainboard companies, Table 2 shows the proportion of going private transactions 
between 2010 to 2014 in the UK and Singapore that have been effected by way of 
schemes of arrangement, general offers and exit offers (which are offers that are made by 
existing controlling shareholders in connection with the proposals to delist the company).  
 
For Table 2, the UK data is obtained from the transactions reported in SDC 
Platinum Database and Practical Law for Companies. The Singapore data is obtained 
from transactions reported in SDC Platinum Database, and due to the incompleteness of 
some of the data, we have cross-checked with the filings by these companies on the 
SGX’s website, using the search ‘Shareholders’ Circular’, for the relevant years, and 
supplemented by cross-checking with the filings.  
 
Table 2: Deal structures for completed going private deals for targets in Singapore and 
the UK for the period 2010-2014 (both dates inclusive)125  
                                                        
124  This free float requirement is only for Mainboard companies. There is no free float requirement 
for companies listed on AIM: see AIM regulation: Inside AIM - Consideration of Free Float and Systems, 
Procedures and Controls - Financial Policies and Procedures (1 June 2015). 
125  Table 2 reports figures on going private deals from 2010 to 2014 (inclusive). The Singapore data 
is obtained from SDC Platinum, supplemented with inspection of circulars found on the Singapore 
Exchange’s website at www.sgx.com; the UK data on schemes and offers is obtained from SDC Platinum 
database, and the data on the delisting offer information is obtained from Practical Law for Companies. 
Column (1) shows the total number of going private M&A deals in UK and Singapore respectively. The 
number of going private deals is found from SDC Platinum coding the transaction as going private, or 
seeking 100% of the target and from Practical Law for Companies. Columns (2) and (3) show the number, 
and percentage, respectively, of these transactions that were structured as schemes. Columns (4) and (5) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Location of 
target 
Total 
number 
of going 
private 
deals  
Schemes % of (1) General 
offers  
% of (1) Exit 
offers 
% of 
(1) 
Singapore 
(Mainboard 
and 
Catalist)  
124 6 4.8 82 66.1 36 29.80 
UK 
(Mainboard 
and AIM) 
327 139 42.5 188 57.5 8 2.4 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the UK has a far higher percentage of schemes being used 
compared to Singapore, and that Singapore has a higher percentage of exit offers 
(coupled with delisting proposals) being used compared to UK. We suggest that the result 
can be explained by the differing requirements for effecting a scheme of arrangement as 
compared to the exit offer. To effect a scheme of arrangement, it requires a majority in 
number representing 75% of the shareholding in both jurisdictions. To effect the exit 
offer coupled with the delisting proposal, the threshold in UK is 75% (pre-May 2014) and 
80% (post-May 2014), and in Singapore, it is 75%, with no more than 10% voting 
against. The main difference between the scheme of arrangement and the delisting 
proposal is that the bidder cannot vote its existing shareholdings in the schemes but is 
able to vote its existing shareholdings in the delisting proposal. 126 We predict that bidders 
                                                        
show the number, and percentage, respectively of these transactions that were structured as offers. Columns 
(6) and (7) show the number, and percentage, respectively of these transactions that were structured as 
delisting proposals, followed by exit offers.  
126 In Singapore, the bidder and its concert parties are prohibited from voting in the scheme: Takeover 
Code, Definition 1. In UK, case law has established that the bidder and its subsidiaries must form a separate 
class: see Re Hellenic and General Trust [1976] 1 WLR 123. For a general discussion on the UK position, 
see J Payne, ‘Schemes of Arrangement, Takeovers and Minority Shareholder Protection’ Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 11 (2011) 67-97.  
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with significant shareholdings in the target are incentivised to proceed by way of an exit 
offer (coupled with the delisting proposal) in order to vote their existing shareholdings, 
rather than a scheme, in which any dissenters would have a comparatively large voice. 
Conversely, bidders with small existing shareholdings would prefer to use a scheme to 
take advantage of the cram-down provision, as not being able to vote their stake would 
not make a significant difference. 
 
Table 3 shows the shareholdings of the companies that have undergone schemes 
of arrangement for the purpose of privatisation. The UK and Singapore data is obtained 
from SDC Platinum, and in the case of Singapore, due to the incompleteness of the data, 
also through inspection of the circulars. In the UK, the overwhelming majority of the 
schemes of arrangement relate to companies where there is no controlling shareholder or 
the bidder does not hold 25% or more of the target. For Singapore, while the sample size 
is much smaller, the results are similar. This is consistent with our prediction made 
above. 
 
 
Table 3: Case studies on Scheme proposals for targets in Singapore and UK for the 
period 2010 -2014127 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                                                        
127  Source: Singapore data is obtained from the SDC Platinum database and inspection of the 
circulars. UK data is obtained from SDC Platinum database. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 show the total number of 
companies where the shareholdings of the controlling shareholders or concert party group pre-offer is (1) 
less than or equal to 25%; (2) more than 25% but less than or equal to 50%; (3) more than 50% but less 
than or equal to 75% and (4) more than 75%. Column 5 shows the total number of transactions that are 
structured as schemes. 
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Total number of schemes 
  
 Location 
of target 
Shareholdings 
pre-offer 
Shareholdings 
pre-offer  
Shareholdings 
pre-offer: Shareholdings 
pre-offer >75% 
Total 
≤% 25 >25  >50  
  ≤50% ≤75% 
Singapore 
(Mainboard 
and 
Catalist) 
4 1 1 0 6 
UK 
(Mainboard 
and AIM) 
127 6 3 3 139 
 
 
Table 4 is the equivalent of Table 3 for delisting proposals coupled with exit 
offers, studying the shareholdings of bidders effecting privatisation through this route. 
UK data is obtained from Practical Law for Companies, and Singapore data is identified 
based on the filings by these companies on the SGX’s website, using the search 
‘Shareholders’ Circular’, for the relevant years (for Singapore). The SDC Platinum 
database was used to cross-check the list of takeover offers, with omissions added to the 
sample by manually collecting from various sources. Again, we predict that the results 
will show that this route is popular among bidders with significant existing 
shareholdings. 
 
Table 4: Case studies on delisting proposals for targets in Singapore and UK for the 
period 2010 – 2014 (both dates inclusive)128 
                                                        
128 Source: Singapore data is obtained from the SDC Platinum database and inspection of the 
circulars. UK data is obtained from Practical Law for Companies, a subscription database. Column 1 
shows the total number of voluntary delistings in Singapore and UK. Columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the total 
number of companies where the shareholdings of the controlling shareholders or concert party group is (1) 
less than or equal to 25%; (2) more than 25% but less than or equal to 50%; (3) more than 50% but less 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Total 
number 
of 
voluntary 
delistings 
Total number of voluntary delistings 
Total 
number 
of 
voluntary 
delistings 
where no 
offers are 
made) (where exit offers are made by existing shareholders) 
 Location 
of target  
  
Shareholdings 
pre-offer 
Shareholdings 
pre-offer  
Shareho
ldings 
pre-
offer: 
Shareholdin
gs pre-
offer >75% 
Total   
≤% 25 >25  >50  
  ≤50% ≤75% 
Singapore 
(Mainboard 
and 
Catalist)  
36 1 6 13 16 36 0 
UK 
(Mainboard 
and AIM)+ 
116 1 0 4 3 8* 96* 
 
*The 8 transactions involve exit offers being made by existing shareholders. There are 
another 12 transactions where the offer is made by the company (such as via a share buy-
back or scheme of arrangement) but which are not included since the study only relates to 
exit offers made by existing shareholders.  
+ In May 2014, the Mainboard rules were amended to include a more stringent criteria for delistings; 
however, all of the delisting transactions where exit offers are made were made for Mainboard companies 
were made before May 2014.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4, as with Table 3, matches this author’s prediction. The shareholding 
percentages of bidders in companies making exit offers in conjunction with a delisting 
                                                        
than or equal to 75% and (4) more than 75% respectively. Column 6 shows the total number of withdrawals 
of delistings where exit offers by controlling shareholders are made. It should be noted that in the case of 
Singapore, all delisting proposals are required to be accompanied by exit offers. Column 7 shows the total 
number of withdraws of delistings where exit offers by controlling shareholders are not made. 
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are significantly higher than shareholdings of those offerors who effect privatisation by 
way of a scheme. A very significant majority of shareholders in both jurisdictions had 
more than 50% of shares in the target. For the 8 UK companies identified, all were 
companies where the controlling shareholders own 75% or more or at least are able to 
procure undertakings from shareholders such that they, together with the undertaking 
shareholders, control 75% or more of the target.  
 
 While the sample size of the companies is small as we have only investigated the 
five-year period between 2010 to 2014, the results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are consistent 
with our prediction that in a jurisdiction where shareholdings are more diffused, the 
bidder seeking to privatise the company will prefer the more favourable shareholder 
approval for schemes of arrangement (which is a majority in number representing 75% of 
the shareholding, present and voting, excluding the bidder’s shares) than in an exit offer 
(which is 75%). The converse is true for a jurisdiction with concentrated shareholdings. 
 
The results above show that despite the legal transplant of UK rules to effect and 
govern takeovers in Singapore, the two jurisdictions have experienced opposite 
outcomes, possibly due to the difference in shareholding concentration. In particular, in 
Singapore where there are generally more concentrated shareholdings, bidders favour a 
method of privatisation which offers fewer protections to minority shareholders. In this 
author’s view, the more widespread use of delistings as a means of effecting 
privatisations in Singapore is less of a concern if there are other robust methods of 
protecting minority shareholders. However, the only minority shareholder protection is 
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that the requirement in the listing rules that the exit offer must be reasonable,129 which is 
not defined. It is expected that the SGX will base the reasonableness of the offer on the 
independent financial adviser (IFA) that is required to be appointed.130 As argued in a 
previous work, the effectiveness of the IFA as a tool to protect investors is doubtful as the 
main concern being, as usual, that outside IFAs, even when chosen by independent 
directors, may be less independent than they appear to be, as they have incentives to gain 
from offering other banking and underwriting services and that they have the unfettered 
discretion to choose the methodologies to provide the valuation.131  
 
V. RECENT TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS  
1. Rise in foreign listings and influx of foreign investment 
The following sets out the analysis on the recent shareholding patterns in 
Singapore and its implications on whether the current enforcement framework of the 
takeover regulation is adequate.  
 
First, there has been a rise in foreign listings. Since the Asian financial crisis, the 
SGX has aggressively encouraged the listing or cross-listing of foreign firms, particularly 
Chinese firms, in Singapore. Approximately 40% of the listed firms are now foreign 
                                                        
129  SGX, ‘Companies Seeking Delisting Must Provide Reasonable Exit Offer to Shareholders’, 
Regulator’s Column (4 September 2009). 
130  Wai Y Wan, ‘Independent Financial Advisers’ Opinions for Public Takeovers and Related Party 
Transactions in Singapore’ (2010) 30 CSLJ 32. 
 
131  Ibid. 
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companies.132 For many of these foreign firms, the SGX serves purely as external funding 
as the assets or operations are primarily outside Singapore. 
 
 The rise of these foreign listings has posed significant challenges to the 
enforcement framework.133 In particular, the recent scandals of the S-Chips, which are 
SGX-listed firms but whose assets are operations are outside Singapore, demonstrate the 
inadequacy of an enforcement framework which is not adequately backed by statute. In 
the recent China Sky Chemical Fibre saga, a company incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands and which had primarily China-based assets, the board of the company initially 
refused to comply with the SGX’s directive to appoint a special auditor, over the SGX’s 
concerns as to its interested person transactions, the aborted acquisition and development 
of land in China and significant repair and maintenance costs incurred.134 This was the 
first time where non-compliance with the SGX directive ordering the appointment of a 
special audit has occurred.135 The SGX applied under section 25 of the SFA136 to enforce 
compliance but the application was withdrawn shortly after it was filed.137 Although no 
reasons were given for the withdrawal, it is likely that the SGX was unlikely to obtain the 
orders that are sought for two reasons: first, only the issuers are contractual parties to the 
                                                        
132  The statistics from the World Federation of Exchanges, as at July 2014, shows that 37% of the 
companies listed on Singapore Exchange are foreign companies.  
133  e.g. Paul M Jindra ‘Securities Fraud in Singapore: China and the Challenge of Deterrence’ 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 51 (2012) 120-176. 
134  For the background facts, see Yeap Wai Kong v Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd  
[2012] SGHC 103 
135  Lynete Khoo, ‘China Sky-SGX saga a test case’, Business Times (11 January 2012). 
136  Section 25 of the SFA provides that a person ‘who is under an obligation to comply with, observe, 
enforce or give effect to the …. listing rules’ fails to do so, the High Court may, on the application of the 
SGX, make an order directing that the first-mentioned person to comply with observe, enforce or give 
effect to the listing rules. 
137  Lynette Khoo ‘SGX backs down from court action against China Sky’, Business Times, 12 
January 2012. 
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listing rules and section 25 merely adds to the contractual basis of enforcement (and does 
not provide a new basis of enforcement against directors);138 second, section 25 only 
refers to compliance listing rules and the SGX’s directives (as opposed to the listing 
rules) do not strictly fall within the listing rules.  
  
 Second, there have been a number of high profile takeovers of established 
Singapore companies in the last decade by foreign corporations. Carney reported that 
between 1996 and 2008, 15 Singapore listed companies have been bought out by widely 
held foreign corporations. This figure was the highest among the nine East Asian 
jurisdictions.139 This trend has continued post-2008. In 2012, Fraser and Neave, Limited 
(F&N) and Asia Pacific Breweries (APB) were taken over by Thai Beverage and 
Heineken, both of which are foreign corporations.140  
 
Thusfar, national sentiment has not played a role and the takeovers of Fraser and 
Neave and Asia Pacific Breweries were largely driven by valuation. However, in the 
1970s, arising from the activities of Slater Walker which made a takeover offer for Haw 
Par and subsequently acquired a controlling interests in a number of local firms, the 
media reported hostility by the businesses towards foreign participation in the local 
industries.141 Arising from the Haw Par / Chung Khiaw affair, in 1971, the Monetary 
                                                        
138  See also discussion in Hans Tjio, Principles and Practice of Securities Regulation in Singapore, 
2nd ed. (Lexisnexis, 2011), paras 5.03-04.  
139  Carney and Child, ‘Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian corporations between 
1996 and 2008’. See also L Yee, ‘Foreigners streaming in to buy Singapore assets’ Business Times (8 June 
2006), listing the deals on major iconic brands owned by companies that have been taken over, including 
Raffles Holdings (which own Raffles hotel) and Robinson & Co (a major retailer). 
140 For a discussion on this, see Wan and Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore, ch 1. See also 
Kenneth Lim, ‘F&N saga opens can of firsts for Singapore M&A’ Business Times (18 February 2013). 
141  See P Pillai, ‘Corporate Takeovers in Singapore’.   
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Authority of Singapore imposed a foreign shareholding limit of 20%, which was later 
increased to 40%, for Singapore banks in 1990.142 That limit was abolished in 1999.143  
 
Outside of the banking industry and other industries that are regarded as critical to 
national interests,144 the Singapore Government has pursued a policy of an open 
economy. In 1974, arising from the Haw Par/PERNAS affair (which involved, among 
other things, financial irregularities with Haw Par leading to a Government 
investigation), the Minister made it clear that the Singapore Government would not 
pursue legislation that would protect Singaporean businesses and thus undermine 
Singapore’s open economy.145 The abolition of the tranches of foreign and local 
shareholding in the late 1990s and early 2000s outlined earlier is also evidence of further 
liberalization of the economy to allow for foreign interests. 
 
The rise in foreign listings coupled with interest from foreign corporations raise 
the issue of whether the informal nature of takeover regulation undertaken by the SIC in 
                                                        
142  TK Soh ‘Foreign Ownership for Local Banks Raised’, Business Times (27 June 1990) 
143  ‘The present situation is not sustainable’, Business Times (18 May 1999) 
144  e.g. the Banking Act, Finance Companies Act, Newspaper and Printing Act. Certain companies 
critical to national interests also have ‘special shares’, such as Singapore International Airlines (to comply 
with the air service agreements that require the company to be held by Singapore nationals) and ST 
Engineering (which is involved with the area of national defence).  
145  Hon Sui Sen, Minister for Finance, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 34 (1975) at col 1152:  
[Members of Parliament] will be aware of the efforts of my Ministry to encourage the further 
development of Singapore as a major regional and international financial centre. The success we have 
achieved has been due in large measure to our policy of welcoming the free inflow of all capital, whether 
regional or international, and whether for use directly in trade, industry or construction or merely for 
portfolio investments. Few if any restrictions are imposed on such investments which, when so desired, 
may be and often are in wholly-owned locally incorporated companies as well as in branches of foreign or 
multi-national companies. The presence of many old and new trading houses, manufacturing industries, 
banks, insurance companies, merchant banks, discount houses as well as holding companies and 
conglomerates is sufficient evidence of the effective operation of our policy. However, to ensure orderly 
conditions and fair terms of competition - and where many investors are concerned, fair treatment of 
minority interests - it has been necessary, here as elsewhere, to provide by law for the regulation of 
company operations. 
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Singapore will continue to endure. This issue is by no means new. In 1984, section 179 of 
the Companies Act 1967146 dealing with takeovers was amended to specifically provide 
that the Takeover Code applies to local or foreign corporations.147 The Government took 
the view that greater legislative intervention was necessary to give statutory teeth to the 
Takeover Code due to the influx of foreign investment.148  
 
 
Thus far, while there have been progressive amendments to the legislative 
framework to give statutory teeth to the SIC and the Takeover Code, the legislation has 
not been amended to give backing to the SIC to apply to the court to enforce those orders. 
The provision is now present in the UK Companies Act 2006.149 In this author’s view, 
this is necessary. Aside from public censure and cold-shouldering the participants, a 
legislated power granted to the SIC to compel recalcitrant parties to comply with orders is 
needed. At present, market participants have largely accepted the authority of the SIC in 
Singapore without the requirement of statutory backing and enforcement powers. 
However, as demonstrated by the China Sky affair in the context of directives from SGX, 
foreign companies and their directors, who may not be used to self-regulation in 
Singapore, may refuse to comply with the directives and there needs to be means to 
enforce such directives, particularly for foreign companies.  
 
                                                        
146  This is now found in section 139 of the SFA. 
147  Companies (Amendment) Act 1984; Act Supplement No.15 of 1984. 
148  See MP Chan, ‘Securities Regulation in Singapore and KL’, Business Times (14 August 1984); 
also see the speech by the Minister for Law, Singapore Parliamentary Debates 43 (1984), col 346. 
149  Companies Act, s 955. 
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2. The potential overlap in jurisdiction between the SIC and the courts 
 
Part 3 argues that the endurance of the SIC has been not only in its speed and 
flexibility in dealing with disputes but also its record and functions in prioritising public 
over private interests in appropriate cases. In the context of securities regulation, the 
remedial orders that may be made by the SIC are wide ranging and do not have a 
corresponding counterpart elsewhere. For example, MAS, the primary securities 
regulator, has no jurisdiction to grant compensation orders, nor does it have jurisdiction 
to apply to the court for orders to compensate people affected by the contravention of the 
market misconduct provisions of the SFA. Instead, persons affected by market 
misconduct will have to apply to court to seek civil compensation orders against the 
persons who have contravened the SFA.150 In practice, there are significant obstacles to 
the recovery of such civil compensation by investors, which are documented elsewhere, 
including collective action problems and the statutory caps on recovery in certain 
cases.151 In contrast, under the Takeover Code regime, the SIC carries out the 
investigation and makes remedial orders, which may include ordering the parties to pay 
the likely losses incurred by the investors.152 As such, an investor is treated more 
favourably under the Takeover Code and is likely to favour SIC intervention. 
                                                        
150  SFA, ss 234 and 236.  
151  See discussion in Wai Y Wan, ‘Enforcement of the Takeover Code and Market Misconduct in the 
Course of Takeovers’ in Wan and Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore, ch 16. 
152  The Takeover Code (Takeover Code, Introduction, para 2) sets out the power to order 
compensation for contravention of the following non-exhaustive rules:  
 Rule 10 (requires that a bidder treats all shareholders equally); 
 Rule 14 (requires a mandatory offer to be made and the terms of the offer);  
 Rule 15 (requires that a voluntary offer must be made on certain terms); 
 Rule 16.4(g) (requires a bidder to make a comparable offer in the case of a partial offer);  
 Rule 16.4(h) (requires a bidder to make an appropriate partial offer for outstanding convertible 
securities in the target);  
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Despite the SIC’s ability to order compensation, the Takeover Code and the SIC 
will (in theory) not deal with the private law obligations that the participants are under in 
the takeover, such as whether a party is in breach of contract or breach of any other 
obligation imposed under general law. The SIC should also not deal with cases involving 
minority shareholder oppression, which is a matter of company law.153  
 
However, there is still the potential for overlapping jurisdictions between the 
takeover regulator and the courts in regulating takeover offers. As set out in Part III 
above, in the interests of promoting certainty and predictability, the SIC has made rulings 
which may potentially conflict with the parties’ contractual obligations and parties’ duties 
under company law. Thus, while in theory, the remedial aims of the takeover regulator 
and the courts are different, the availability of relief (or lack thereof) will have 
substantive implications for the parties in their private law claims.  
 
Further, General Principle 4 of the Takeover Code, which is no longer found in 
the City Code, provides that ‘rights of control must be exercised in good faith and 
                                                        
 Rule 17 (requires a bidder to make a cash or securities offer); 
 Rule 18 (requires a bidder to make a comparable offer for different classes of equity capital);  
 Rule 19 (requires a bidder to make an appropriate offer to holders of convertible securities in the 
target); 
 Rule 20.4 (requires a bidder to extend revised consideration to all accepting shareholders);  
 Rule 21 (requires the revision of the offer price where purchases are made at above the offer 
price); and  
 Rule 33.2 (requires a 6-month delay before acquisition at above offer price). 
153  Under the Companies Act, minority shareholders may make an application to the court for relief 
from compulsory acquisition under section 215, even if the bidder otherwise complies with the Takeover 
Code. See Umakanth Varottil, ‘Compulsory Acquisitions and Squeeze out of Minority Shareholders’ in 
Wan and Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore, ch 14 at paras 14.32-38. 
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oppression of the minority is wholly unacceptable’. The question then arises whether the 
SIC may, in the future, purport to assert jurisdiction over minority shareholder protection 
issues and thereby pre-empt the courts’ determination. Currently, it does not appear likely 
since none of the detailed rules in the Takeover Code have been tied to this principle of 
unacceptable minority oppression.  
 
It is submitted that there needs to be more open debate as to how to resolve the 
overlap in jurisdictions in regulating takeovers between the SIC and the courts. Although 
this paper is a comparison between UK and Singapore, Australia offers a potential 
solution to the problem. Section 659B(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
prohibits the commencement of proceedings in ‘relation to a takeover bid or proposed 
takeover bid, before the end of the bid period’.154 The objective appears to give primacy 
to takeover regulation by prohibiting the bringing of court proceedings while the bid is in 
force. However, the provision is likely to be narrower than it appears; Lionsgate 
Australia v Macquarie Private Portfolio Management,155 discusses whether a bidder may 
seek specific performance of a substantial shareholder’s contractual promise to sell into 
the bid, prior to the expiry of the bid period. Austin J took a very restrictive reading of the 
provision, holding that the provision does not prevent such an action, which is an action 
to enforce a contractual right, not an action taken or to be taken as part of, or for the 
purposes of the bid. This article does not necessarily advocate that the choice made in 
                                                        
154  In the case of the scheme of arrangement, while the Australian Panel has powers to declare 
unacceptable circumstances under Corporations Act, s 657A(2)(a), it will generally not intervene: see 
Australian Takeovers Panel, ‘Guidance Note 1’, para 18. See RP Austin, ‘The Courts and the Panel’, The 
Takeovers Panel After 10 years (Jennifer Hill and RP Austin eds, Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, 
Corporate and Taxation Law Publication Series, 2011), 131. 
155  [2007] NSWC 318. 
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section 659B(1) is appropriate in Singapore but that greater consideration needs to be 
given as to how to properly delineate the responsibilities of the SIC and the courts. 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The recent literature on comparative takeover regulation has demonstrated the 
reasons for the striking differences between the UK and US takeover laws, on the basis of 
interest group politics. This research shows that the theory can also be extended to 
Singapore which has transplanted the UK-style of takeover regulation and it explains why 
blockholders will also favour such a model. However, as the experience with Singapore 
shows, the transplantation of the mandatory bid rule and the no-frustration rule in a 
jurisdiction which is dominated by listed companies with concentrated shareholdings has 
led to quite different outcomes in the shareholding structures and the market for corporate 
control. The mandatory bid rule has led to a reinforcement of the concentration of 
shareholdings. Hostile or unsolicited takeovers are rare and the going private transactions 
are more likely to be effected by delisting proposals, where coercive offers are more 
likely to take place. Finally, this article addresses the prospect of formalising the existing 
takeover regulation model to give statutory teeth in respect of enforcement powers and 
the need for more open date as to how to resolve the potential overlap in the jurisdiction 
of regulating takeovers between the court and the SIC. The experience of Singapore has 
relevance to other emerging jurisdictions (whose shareholdings are more likely to be 
concentrated than dispersed found in advance economies) seeking to transplant, with or 
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without modifications, the mandatory bid rule and/or the no-frustration rule found in UK-
takeover regulation framework.  
